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Abstract
“Limits of Arbitrage” theories require that the marginal investor in a particular asset
market be a specialized arbitrageur. Then the constraints faced by this arbitrageur (i.e.
capital constraints) feed through into asset prices. We examine the mortgage-backed
securities (MBS) market in this light, as casual empiricism suggests that investors in the
MBS market do seem to be very specialized. We show that risks that seem relatively
minor for aggregate wealth are priced in the MBS market. A simple pricing kernel based
on the aggregate value of MBS securities prices risk in the MBS market. The evidence
suggests that limits of arbitrage theories can help explain the behavior of spreads in
this market.
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In the Fall of 1998, spreads on mortgage backed securities (MBS) widened substantially
over Treasuries. At the same time, spreads in other markets also widened.1 These events
were coincident with turmoil in the hedge fund industry and the well publicized troubles of
Long Term Capital Management.
Recent theories (“limits of arbitrage”) suggest a causal link running from the losses
suﬀered by hedge funds to the widening of spreads.2 Arbitrageurs lost money over this
period and their ability to take risk-positions decreased as their capital fell. As a result,
arbitrageurs sold out of many positions leading to rising spreads.
Figure 1 illustrates the behavior of spreads (over Treasuries) on a sample of mortgage
backed securities. In addition to the high spreads in 1998, note the high spreads in late-
1993/early-1994. Events in this earlier period also ﬁt the limits of arbitrage theory. A
number of mortgage hedge funds lost money in 1993 as interest rates rose. A prominent
example was Askins Capital Management which was rumored to have lost around $400
million.























































The option adjusted spreads on a panel of interest-only strips (IO’s) is plotted against time.
The data from10/93 to 3/98 is from Salomon-Smith-Barney.  The data from 4/98 to 12/01 is
hand-collected from Bloomberg.
We provide evidence that advances the case for the limits of arbitrage theory. The
diﬃculty in judging the theory based on Figure 1 is that the evidence boils down to just the
two data points of 1993 and 1998. Our innovation is to develop and test the implications of
the limits of arbitrage theory for the cross-section of mortgage backed securities. The use
of cross-sectional data substantially increases the data available to test the theory.
The main idea is as follows. We note that the limits of arbitrage theory requires that
1See for example Krishnamurthy (2002) on the 30-year bond spread.
2See, for example, Shleifer and Vishny (1997), Kyle and Xiong (2001) or Gromb and Vayanos (2002).
1the marginal investor in the MBS market is a specialized arbitrageur. Thus the constraints
faced by these arbitrageurs aﬀects asset prices. In contrast, traditional asset pricing theory
assumes that the marginal investor in the MBS market is the same as that in the broad
US capital market. If the marginal investor is a specialized mortgage arbitrageur, then the
relative v a l u a t i o no fa s s e t sw i t h i nt h eM B Sm a r k e tw i l la l s or e ﬂe c tt h i si n v e s t o r ’ sp r e f e r e n c e s .
We develop a theory and tests around this idea.
An MBS is a security whose cash ﬂows are linked to payments of an underlying pool of
(typically consumer) mortgages. Mirroring the underlying consumer mortgage, the MBS is
basically a debt security with a declining principal value. However the diﬃculty in valu-
ing (and hedging) MBS is that the decline in the principal is linked to actual consumer
prepayments on the underlying pool of mortgages. These prepayments are not just a func-
tion of interest rates, but empirically seem driven by a host of other factors including local
macroeconomic variables, demographics, etc.
To price MBS, Wall Street traders have developed sophisticated statistical models of
consumer prepayment. These models forecast a pattern of cash ﬂows for a given MBS,
which can then be priced using standard techniques. However the traders can directly only
hedge the interest rate components of their models. So, to the extent that the actual pattern
of prepayments diﬀers from the statistical model (in a way that is not captured by interest
rate variation), the traders will be left with residual risk.
We exploit aspects of this residual risk to reach conclusions regarding the marginal
investor in the MBS market. In principle, this residual risk should have a price of close to
zero. One would be hard-pressed to ﬁnd a correlation between the mortgage prepayments
that are orthogonal to interest rates and aggregate wealth. In our data, the point estimate
of the correlation with aggregate stock returns is 0.017. So, the risk should be diversiﬁable
and should not carry a risk premium.
The ﬁrst piece of evidence is that the residual risk is priced. In order to recover actual
security prices in the MBS market, one has to discount with an additional spread - the “op-
tion adjusted spread” (OAS) - in valuing the cash ﬂows based on the statistical prepayment
model. It is common for traders to quote the OAS when pricing a particular MBS, or to
use the OAS to compare diﬀerent MBS. We have OAS data from a prominent mortgage
trading ﬁrm for a panel of MBS securities. We measure the residual risk for each of these
securities, and ﬁnd a strong linear relation between a security’s residual risk and OAS.
By itself, this result is not conclusive. Note that the OAS is measured relative to a
benchmark ﬁnancial model - it is analogous to an implied volatility for an option priced using
the Black-Scholes formula. In the same way, it could be that the benchmark prepayment
model is incorrect, and that this bias is most apparent in MBS with high residual risk.
We are more compelled by evidence that the pricing of this residual risk varies in a
2systematic way depending on the total value of the MBS market. This is exactly what one
should ﬁnd if the marginal investor is specialized to the MBS market.
Suppose that the set of buyers and sellers in the MBS market consist of banks and
traders whose incentives are such that they are paid more when the MBS market performs
well. For example, suppose that their compensation contracts pay them based on their
proﬁts on trading in the MBS market. If as a community these traders are the main holders
of the MBS market, then their net compensation will in fact be highest when the MBS
market rises.
If these banks and traders are the marginal investors in the MBS market, then securities
where the residual risk is correlated with declines in the value of the MBS market will have
higher risk premia. We ﬁnd this to be the case.
The eﬀect of prepayments on MBS depends on the diﬀerence between mortgage coupon
rates and market interest rates. For example, if coupons are much higher than market
interest rates, then faster than expected prepayments decrease the value of mortgages. The
opposite is true when coupon rates are below market interest rates.
We ﬁnd that the pricing of residual prepayment risk depends on the diﬀerence between
the average mortgage coupons and market interest rates. For example, when average coupon
rates are close to market interest rates, prepayments have little eﬀect on the total value of
mortgages. We ﬁnd that the price of residual risk is very low in these environments (even
for a speciﬁch i g hc o u p o nM B S ! )
The evidence forwarded in this paper is consistent with some other recent papers in the
literature. Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin (2001) study the corporate bond market.
They ﬁnd that a simple Merton (1973) model explains very little of the price changes in
a panel of corporate bond prices. Even after including macro factors (stock market, etc.)
they are only able to explain about 25% of price changes. The tantalizing evidence they
present is that the bulk of the remaining price changes are due to a single factor that is
common across all corporate bonds. Unlike us, they are unable to identify either this risk
factor or the marginal investor who is pricing this risk3.
Boudoukh, Richardson, Stanton, and Whitelaw (1997) provide similar evidence for the
MBS market. These authors study the pricing of GNMA securities under a benchmark
model (a multifactor interest rate model) that they propose. They study the errors of this
model in pricing a panel of GNMA securities over a period from 1987 to 1994. Similar to
Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin, they ﬁnd that a single (non-interest-rate) factor
accounts for 80-90% of the common variation in the pricing errors.
Closer to our analysis is the work by Froot and O’Connell (1999) on the market for
3We conjecture that our theory could shed light on their results. We are developing this idea in ongoing
work.
3catastrophe insurance. They note that there are times at which the price of catastrophe
insurance seems to get unusually high. Froot and O’Connell demonstrate that these are also
times in which the capital of all catastrophe insurers is low, and the quantity of insurance
transacted is also low. Like us, they argue that the marginal investor in the catastrophe
insurance market is an institution (the insurers) rather than the broad capital market. They
reconcile the facts as: When the capital in the insurance market is low, the insurers are less
willing to write catastrophe insurance and therefore the prices are high and the quantities
transacted are low.
Merton (1987) is an early attempt to explore the implications of market segmentation for
asset prices. The theory we develop in this paper is closer to the limits of arbitrage literature
in which the marginal investor is a specialized institution, and the constraints faced by
this institution feed through to asset prices. Allen and Gale (1994) study an environment
in which traders must specialize ex-ante in a certain asset market, and this implies that
ex-post there is limited market participation and the wealth of the specialized traders is
critical in setting prices. Similar ideas are explored by Dow and Gorton (1994), Shleifer
and Vishny (1997), Kyle and Xiong (2001) and Gromb and Vayanos (2002). Caballero and
Krishnamurthy (2001, 2002) propose a model of emerging market crises in which the crisis is
an event in which the marginal investor switches from the world capital market to a trader
within the emerging market.
2 Description of the mortgage market
Mortgage backed securities are ﬁnancial securities that are backed by a pool of underlying
mortgages. As of June 2002 there was about $3.9 trillion worth of securitized mortgages.
As mentioned in the introduction, valuing MBS is complex because the cash-ﬂows from
an MBS will depend on the prepayment behavior of the consumers in the underlying mort-
gage pool. Valuing the MBS is typically a two-step process. First, one assumes prepayment
behavior as a deterministic function of interest rate paths, housing prices and so on (Richard
and Roll 1989, Schwartz and Torous 1990). Then one simulates several interest rate paths,
discounting and averaging the cash-ﬂows based on a term-structure model that is calibrated
to the current market risk-free rates.
The model-implied prices under this methodology typically diﬀer from quoted market
prices. Market participants express this diﬀerence by quoting for each security a number
called an Option-Adjusted Spread (OAS). More speciﬁcally, after the prepayment option has
been taken into account through a deterministic prepayment function, the OAS is a spread
added to interest rates in the term-structure valuation model in order to recover the quoted
market price of the security (equation (7) below). To the extent that the term-structure
4model is correct, the OAS is a “non-interest rate” risk premium on the security.
We study the OAS on a panel of securities in order to reach conclusions regarding the
marginal investor in the MBS market.
Some market participants view the OAS as a risk-premium for bearing model-prepayment
risk — this is our assumption as well. But it should be clear that OAS could be captur-
ing many other things. To the extent that the term-structure model is mis-speciﬁed, the
OAS could reﬂect an interest rate risk premium. To the extent that the prepayment model
does not accurately reﬂect the prepayment option, the OAS could be capturing the true
value of the prepayment option. Finally, although we study fairly liquid securities, the OAS
could reﬂect a liquidity premium. These alternatives will pose a challenge for our empirical
methodology.
We have so far used the generic term mortgage-backed securities, which comprises all
the securities that are subject both to interest rate risk and prepayment risk. In fact, MBS
are very diverse in form. The most typical MBS are the collateral (or passthroughs) which
pass both interest and principal payments of the underlying pool of loans to the investor.
Collateral is often stripped into two derivatives: the IO (Interest-Only) which passes only
the interest payments to the investor, and the PO (Principal-Only) which pays the amount
of principal amortized each month (scheduled amortization and prepayments).
3M o d e l
In this section we describe a very simple environment for studying the pricing of MBS and
the OAS. We then develop a general equilibrium model and present our main hypotheses
regarding the pricing of MBS.
3.1 Mortgage backed securities with no prepayment risk
Consider a world with a constant interest rate of r and a mortgage-pool with constant
prepayment rate of φ and coupon of c.A t a n y d a t e t, the amount of outstanding of this




given some a(0). We normalize a(0) = 1.
The IO is deﬁned as the claim on all of the coupons from this mortgage-pool. Thus, the






















Finally the value of the mortgage itself — the collateral — is,





Our aim is to develop an equilibrium model along the lines of a static CAPM to illustrate
how prepayment risk is priced.
There are two periods, t =0 ,1. We assume that the riskless interest rate is constant
a n dn o r m a l i z ei tt ob eo n e . W ea s s u m et h e r ea r eK mortgage pools. In each pool, the
mortgage has coupon ck and quantity θk.W ea s s u m et h a tm o r t g a g e s“ p a y o ﬀ”a td a t e1a s
af u n c t i o no fck,rand φk. We next describe the payoﬀ function.
We assume that the only uncertainty is in the prepayment rate, φk, of mortgage-k.T h e
mean forecast of φk is ¯ φk. Pricing the IO, for example, based on this mean forecast would




r + ¯ φk.
T h ep r o b l e mi st h a tt h e r ei sm o d e lr i s ka st h ea c t u a lφk may diﬀer from ¯ φk.L e t ∆φk =
φk − ¯ φk be this variation.4 We assume that ∆φk has mean zero and covariance matrix of
Ω.
For simplicity, we linearize the above valuation expressions and assume that the date 1









Where ηk =1 /
¡
r + ¯ φk¢
and −ηk ck
r+¯ φk is the derivative of the IO with respect to the pre-
payment rate.


















4Unlike our abstraction, in practice interest rates are uncertain. The logical extension of our model to the
uncertain interest rate case is to write ¯ φ
k(˜ r). Then the innovation of ∆φ
k is the uncertainty in prepayments





PO be the date 0 prices of one dollar face value of the IO and PO. The OAS
is deﬁned as the premium to the discount rate of r that is required to recover the market
prices of the securities under the mean prepayment forecast. For example, in the case of




r + ¯ φk + OASk
IO
(7)
That is the mean prepayment forecast is ¯ φk. Evaluated at this forecast, the value of the
IO would be ck
r+¯ φk. So, the OAS is the premium to r required to recover the actual market
price.5
T h e r ea r et w ow a y st ol o o ka tt h eO A S .F i r s t ,i tm a ys i m p l yr e ﬂected a mis-speciﬁed
model of the prepayment option. Perhaps informed market participants have a true model
of prepayments which is actually ˆ φk. A naive market participant (and the econometrician)
who uses ¯ φk would have to introduce the additional discount rate of ˆ φk − ¯ φk in order to
recover the true market prices.
As e c o n dw a yt ol o o ka tt h eO A Si st h a ti ti sar i s kp r e m i u m . A n yt i m et h a tp r i c e s
diﬀer from expected values, the OAS will be non-zero. However, under this interpretation
it may be either an interest rate risk premium or a prepayment risk premium.
In our empirical tests we will try to rule out the alternative hypotheses that the OAS is
d u et oam i s - s p e c i ﬁed model of the prepayment option or an interest rate risk premium.
Using the same logic as for the IO, the OAS for the collateral is the solution to,
Pk
C =1+
ck − r − OASk
C
r + ¯ φk + OASk
C
(8)
(i.e. it is the previous valuation expression with an adjustment to r).
Now, from (4) and (6) we see that the date 1 payoﬀ on the collateral is equal, state-by-
state, to the payoﬀ on a one dollar face of bond plus the payoﬀ on ck−r















5We have deﬁned the OAS as the instantaneous risk premium. The “lifetime” risk premium, deﬁned as








is the duration of the IO. This is
analogous to a stock with risky dividends, where the lifetime risk premium is the instantaneous risk premium
multiplied by the asset’s duration.
7The relation between the OAS on the IO and the collateral depends on the coupon on
the mortgage relative to market interest rates. In a low interest rate environment (r<c k),
the OAS on the IO and the collateral have the same sign. Intuitively this is because shocks
lowering the value of the IO — i.e., faster prepayments — also lower the value of the collateral.
In the high interest rate environment (r>c k), the converse is true, and the OAS of the
collateral has the opposite sign of the IO.
Note that these relations are derived only from arbitrage considerations. We have not
made any statements about the equilibrium, or how risks are priced.6
3.4 Delegation and the marginal investor
The critical assumption that we make — and for which we provide tests — is that a repre-
sentative MBS trader is the marginal investor in this market. Formally, we assume that at
date 0 there is a set of risk-neutral investors (“investors”) with large endowments, as well
as a set of MBS traders (“traders”) with no endowments. The risk-neutral investors ﬁnd
it unproﬁtable to invest in the MBS market directly. There is extreme adverse selection: if
the investors try to buy mortgage backed securities, then snake oil salesmen will sell them
stuﬀ that is worth zero. As a result they give their funds to the specialized MBS trader
who invests for them. In order to provide incentives to the MBS trader they give the trader
a linear proﬁts h a r eo fα. The problem is that the trader is risk averse. He has utility over




Va r [w]( 1 1 )
i.e. just a mean-variance maximizer.







r + ¯ φk + OASk
PO
Repeating the arbitrage argument in the text (the payoﬀ on the PO is equal to the payoﬀ on a one dollar
face of bond minus the payoﬀ on r










The OAS on the PO and IO have opposite signs. An increase in prepayment hurts the IO but beneﬁts the
PO: Thus the IO and PO have opposite sensitivities to prepayment risk.
7See e.g. Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) for conditions under which a linear incentive is optimal. Given
the relatively small risks of the MBS market, it is also plausible that the linear quadratic approximation is
a good representation of the trader’s risk attitude.
83.5 Equilibrium
At date 0, the investors give w0 to the traders. From this the traders purchase a portfolio
of mortgage backed securities. Let xk
IO and xk
PO be the amount of the k-th IO and PO held
in a portfolio. Then,












PO)( 1 2 )
is the date 1 value of the trader’s portfolio. Since the trader receives a linear proﬁts h a r e ,
his problem is to maximize (11) given (12).
This formulation is a variant of the traditional static CAPM. Deriving the ﬁrst order
condition for the trader’s portfolio choice problem and then substituting in the market
clearing condition of xk
IO = xk
PO = θk, yields an expression for the price of the IO,
ck
r + ¯ φk − Pk
IO = −ρα cov
µ
ck
r + ¯ φkηk∆φk,r M
¶
(13)






r + ¯ φj¢2∆φj(r − cj)( 1 4 )
The term on the right hand side of (13) is a risk premium for holding prepayment risk.
3.6 Covariance structure
We make the following simplifying assumption on the covariance structure. We write,
∆φk = βkΦ + ²k (15)
where, Φ is a common shock aﬀecting prepayment across all securities, βk is the loading of
security k on the common shock, and ²k is an idiosyncratic prepayment shock. We normalize





(r + ¯ φj)2θj(cj − r)
¶
The sum term poses a problem for us to identify in the data. It is a weighted sum
of the coupons of all mortgages in the market, where the weights depend on the amounts
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This expression can be derived from combining (13) with (7), and noting that η
k =1 /(r + ¯ φ
k).
9outstanding of the mortgage and the loading on systematic prepayment risk. To compute
the sum requires us to have data on the entire mortgage market — which we do not have.
Instead, it is common for mortgage traders to follow whether the market as whole is at a
premium or a discount. We compute a weighted average coupon on the liquid benchmarks





βk × ρa(¯ c − r)
| {z }
Market price of risk
(16)
where ¯ c is the weighted average coupon and ρa is just proportional to the risk tolerance of
the MBS trader. The approximation of using the simple weighted average for the coupon is
valid when r is in the neighborhood of ¯ φj. Alternatively, note that the diﬀerence of cj − r
is the dominant factor governing changes in the sum for r near cj.
Loosely speaking, the ﬁrst term in (16) captures the systematic risk of the mortgage,
and the term involving the average market coupon captures the market price of risk (recall
that ρ is the risk tolerance preference parameter for the MBS trader).
In equilibrium, the market price of risk is proportional to ¯ c − r.I n t u i t i v e l y , w h e n
the market as a whole is at a premium — i.e. coupons above r —f a s t e rp r e p a y m e n t sa r e
costly to the representative trader. Thus securities whose value decrease because of faster
prepayments command a positive risk premium. This is the reason that the OAS on the
IO is positively related to ¯ c − r. In fact, securities whose values increase because of faster
prepayments will carry a negative risk premium in this environment. An example of such
a security is the PO. A little algebra gives us that the OAS for the PO is equal to,
OASk
PO = −βk × ρa(¯ c − r) ×
r
¯ φk + OASk
IO
Another example of a security whose value increases with faster prepayment is a discount
collateral. A collateral with a coupon below the market interest rate increases in value if
the mortgage prepays faster than expected. Given relation (16) and (9), we can write the
OAS on the collateral as,
OASk
C = βk × ρa(¯ c − r)(ck − r) ×
1
ck + ¯ φk + OASk
IO
(17)
Thus the OAS on the collateral depends on both whether the market as a whole is at a
premium as well as whether or not a particular security is at a premium. This leads to a
quadratic dependence on r.W et e s tt h i sr e l a t i o ni no u re m p i r i c a lw o r k .
9We have also developed a continuous time model to express the relation between the OAS and pre-
payment risk. The resulting expressions are very similar to the ones we have derived in the text. See
http : //econ − www.mit.edu/faculty/xgabaix/papers.htm for details.
10Finally, all of these relations are reversed when the market as a whole is at a discount. In
this case, faster prepayments increase the value of the market. Hence the IO has a negative
risk premium, while the PO commands a positive risk premium.
The dependence of the price of prepayment risk on (¯ c−r) is really a general equilibrium
implication. It seems plausible that the relation between βk a n dt h eO A Sc o u l db es p u r i o u s ,
or due to model mis-speciﬁcation. But we think that the fact that it depends on the
interaction between βk and (¯ c − r) stems uniquely from equilibrium considerations. Most
of our empirical tests are built around this interaction term.
3.7 Testable empirical predictions
The main predictions of the model are contained in equation (16), which we can unpack as:
OASkt
IO = βkλt (18)
λt = ρa(¯ ct − rt)( 1 9 )
where ρa is a constant proportional to the risk aversion of the traders.
• A. In the cross-section, the loading of IO-k on the common component of prepayment
uncertainty explains the OAS on the IO’s.
• B. In the time-series, the diﬀerence between the average market coupon, ¯ ct,a n dt h e
market interest rate, rt, explains the evolution of the market price of prepayment risk
λt.
• C. In the cross-section, the residual prepayment risk of security-k (i.e. σ(²k)) is not
priced.
• D. Eq. (17) predicts that the OAS on the collateral is quadratic in the market interest
rate, rt,a n di saf u n c t i o no fb o t hck as well as the average market coupon, ¯ ct.
The model also points out two alternative explanations for the OAS that our empirical
work must contend with: The OAS may reﬂect an interest rate risk premium; or, the OAS
may reﬂect a mis-speciﬁed model of the prepayment option. We discuss both of these
possibilities in far greater depth in the next section.
3.8 Discussion
The model we have presented is simpliﬁed along many dimensions in order to isolate the
relation between the OAS and prepayment risk. We comment on two omissions in this
subsection: lack of dynamics, and constant interest rates.
11In a dynamic model the current wealth of the arbitrage traders will be an important
state variable. For example, the view that high MBS spreads in 1993 and 1998 were due
to low arbitrageur capital is an essentially dynamic eﬀect. This is a substantive eﬀect that
our model does not capture. Informally, we can think of a changing ρ as proxying for this
eﬀect.
To the extent that the aggregate value of the mortgage market is a suﬃcient statistic for
the marginal utility of the representative trader, our cross-sectional pricing equations will
be unaﬀected by the omission of dynamics. Generally, in a dynamic model, the marginal
utility will also depend on changes in the investment opportunity set. If preferences are
close to unit-elastic, the latter eﬀect will be small and our analysis will remain valid.
In assuming constant interest rates, we have eliminated two potentially important eﬀects.
First, there is no place for an interest rate risk premium in the OAS. This is actually easy
to ﬁx. We consider a variant of the model with interest rate uncertainty in subsection 5.1
in order to discuss whether or not the OAS includes an interest rates risk premium. The
second eﬀect we ignore is the relation between interest rate volatility and the valuation of
the prepayment option. It is clear that as interest rate volatility increases, the value of a
bond option will rise as well. Since the prepayment option is a bond option, we expect
that the value of mortgage backed securities will also be aﬀected. Brown (1999) notes a
positive relation between OAS and implied volatilities on Treasury bond options. He argues
that this is evidence that market practice is to use a constant volatility in pricing models
a n dt h i sa l s og i v e sr i s et ot h eO A S .W ew i l lh a v et ot a k ei n t oa c c o u n tt h e s ee ﬀects in our
empirical work.
Strictly speaking, these latter two observations only apply in the case that our OAS
data is calculated under a mis-speciﬁed term structure model. Market practice is to use a
term-structure model that is calibrated to current market risk-free rates and then discount
the cash-ﬂows under the risk-neutral measure implied by the term-structure model. So by
construction, the OAS cannot reﬂect interest rate risk. A small miscalibration of those
models is possible, but is unlikely to account for OAS as high as 500bp. In any case, it is
e a s yt or e j e c tt h i sa l t e r n a t i v eb a s e do nt h ee v i d e n c ew ep r e s e n ti nt h en e x ts e c t i o n .
4 Data and estimation
Our data consist of the OAS for nine IO’s and PO’s (see Table 1) furnished by Salomon-
Smith-Barney. This data is daily and covers a period beginning (for some securities) in
August 1993 and ending in March 1998. We also have data on the historical prepayment
rates (monthly frequency) of the underlying collateral. The nine strips chosen are very
liquid securities and fairly representative in age and coupon of the active secondary market.
12The collateral are all FNMA 30-year conventional loans.
Table 1
IO/POa 249 240 252 272 264 237 270 267 268
Couponb (%) 7.08 7.49 7.95 8.07 8.49 8.48 9.01 8.91 9.64
Agec 58 60 63 27 50 70 80 47 110
a: Securities are identiﬁed by their pool number.
b: Weighted average coupon on underlying mortgage pool (±5bp over sample.)
c: Age in months as of July 98.
We also have monthly data on the OAS for six generic FNMA 30-year collateral covering
a period from October 1987 to July 1994. The coupons on these securities range from 7.5%
to 11% and the data was provided by Smith-Breeden. We use this data for some auxiliary
tests. We do not have data on prepayment rates for these securities.
T h eb u l ko fo u ra n a l y s i si sc o n d u c t e du s i n gt h eI Od a t a .T h em a i nr e a s o nw ef o c u so n
the OAS of the IO’s (as opposed to the PO’s) is that they are large and hence measured with
less error.10 O fc o u r s e ,b o t ht h eO A So ft h eI Oa n dt h eP Oc o n t a i nt h es a m ei n f o r m a t i o n ,
as we have shown previously. We return to the OAS on the PO’s brieﬂyw h e nw ed i s c u s s
the interest rate risk premium hypothesis. We construct time series of monthly OAS by
forming simple averages of the daily ﬁgures. This reduces micro-structure eﬀects. The data
is an unbalanced panel, with common last observations, but varying initial observations.
There are two steps in testing (18)—(19). We need an estimate of βk, and we need an
estimate of ¯ c − r.T of o r m¯ c, the average coupon oustanding, we take the “market” to be
represented by 312 liquid securities over the period 1986 to 1998, and then compute the
weighted average of the coupons at each date (weights are amounts outstanding). This
g i v e su sam o n t h l ys e r i e so f¯ ct.W eu s et h e1 0 - y e a rc o n s t a n tm a t u r i t yT r e a s u r yy i e l da srt.
Most of the underlying mortgages have durations around 10 years.
The estimate of βk is a bit more involved. We ﬁrst develop a bare-bones statistical
prepayment model. For each IO, we have the historical paydown of its collateral month by
month, expressed as a series skt (single monthly mortality, or monthly prepayment rate).
The prepayment model is,
skt = α0k + α1krt + α2k(rt − rt−1)+α3kaget + ²kt
where, aget is the age of the mortgage (note that coupon is absorbed into α0k). We assume
that the error follows an AR(1) process,
²kt = ρ²kt−1 + ukt
10This is consistent with the evidence in Breeden (1994), who shows that IO’s have higher signal-to-noise
ratio than PO’s and pass-throughs.
13This procedure results in a time-series of ˆ ukt’s for each security. Note that by construction










































Figure 2: Standard deviation of prepayment errors
The one-year rolling standard deviation of the errors from the empirical prepayment
model are plotted over time.  There are nine mortgage pools that we study.  As a result,
there are nine standard-deviation series.









The ﬁgure present a rolling one-year standard deviation of the errors. The standard de-
viations are higher in the beginning of the sample and at the tail end of the sample, but
more or less constant at other times. For this reason, we take the prepayment risk βk to be
constant throughout our sample.
The more striking pattern in the ﬁgure is that the rankings by standard deviation are
fairly well preserved over time. Our estimate of βk i sb a s e do nt h i sr e l a t i o n .
Table 2
IO/PO 249 240 252 272 264 237 270 267 268
βk (st. dev.) 0.083 0.122 0.181 0.465 0.504 0.561 0.479 0.483 0.384
βk (PCA) 0.058 0.120 0.197 0.431 0.612 0.513 0.475 0.538 0.338
idiosynck (PCA) 0.091 0.078 0.086 0.174 0.270 0.181 0.259 0.190 0.213
βk (mtge. model) 1.06 2.10 3.29 4.80 6.67 5.63 6.58 6.63 5.82
We use two proxies for βk.I nt h eﬁr s tl i n eo fT a b l e2w ep r e s e n tt h es a m p l es t a n d a r d
deviations for the errors. In some of our tests we use these standard deviations as βk.
14However, as we have noted before, the idiosyncratic component of the prepayment risk
s h o u l dn o tb ep r i c e d .W ed on o th a v et h ep r e p a y m e n tr a t e sf o rt h ee n t i r em o r t g a g em a r -
ket. However, on the assumption that our sample is representative, we use a principal-
component’s analysis to extract the common component and the idiosyncratic component
of the prepayment risk.
We focus only on the overlapping observations (22 months) for this analysis.11 The
ﬁrst eigenvector accounts for 83% of the variance which suggests that equation (15) is a
good representation of the data. The second and third components account for 9% and
3.2% respectively. Table 2 (second line) presents the loading on the ﬁrst eigenvector for
each security as well as the standard deviation of the residual (third line). We use the
loading on the common factor as βk, and the residual standard deviation as our measure of
idiosyncratic risk. Unfortunately the two vectors are very similar, and as we will see, the
test of prediction (C) is not informative.
We know that the best predictor of skt given the history of past interest rates is non-
linear (prepayment functions are typically complex non-linear functions of the entire path
of interest rates), however our simple approach avoids the diﬃcult task of calibrating such a
complex model. As a check, we also have prepayment forecasts from the prepayment model
of a mortgage trader and have used these residuals to form β’s. The β’s (subject to scaling
factors) look similar, suggesting that our model is reasonable. See the last line of Table 2.
As a preliminary to our main empirical work, we check whether prepayment risk would
be priced if markets were integrated. We form a time series of prepayment risk innovations








where the βk’s are the loading on the ﬁrst eigenvector from the principal component analysis.
We also form a time series of monthly excess returns on the S&P500 (SPt). The two
series have a correlation coeﬃcient of 0.017. We run a regression of,
Ut = A + B × SPt.
The coeﬃcient estimate for B is 0.482 and the t-statistic is 0.125 (N =5 3 ,R 2 =0 .0003).
We conclude that the two series are unrelated.
The organization of this empirical section is as follows. In the next subsection we give
a brief account of the events that have marked the mortgage market over our sample by
11We have also done the principal component analysis dropping the security with the shortest time series.
This results in 32 months of overlapping observations. The results are close to what we ﬁnd for the 22
months.
15looking at the evolution of rt and ¯ ct. Our main results are in sections 4.2 and 4.3. We
discuss alternative hypotheses and robustness in section 5.
4.1 Interest rates, average market coupon, and OAS





























































The yield on the the 10-year constant maturity Treasury note and the average coupon on a
representative sample of 312 liquid benchmarks in the MBS market are plotted over time.
Figure 3 shows the time-series of the CMT 10 year rt, and the outstanding average
coupon ¯ ct. It is worth noting that the adjustments of the outstanding average coupon are
slow compared to the large movements of market interest rates. Prior to 1993, prevailing
mortgage rates were around 10-11%. There was a large prepayment wave as rates fell in
1992 and 1993. As a consequence, the outstanding average coupon ¯ ct adjusted down from
values of 9-10% to 7-8%. We follow the evolution of the OAS of the IO’s and PO’s from
1993 to 1998. At the start of this period, interest rates were rising as the U.S. economy was
exiting a recession. The Federal Reserve raised their target rate in February of 1994 and
followed this move with several others. Interest rates rose dramatically during this period.
In 1995, there was another important market rally, as rates fell 200 b.p. from January 1995
to January 1996. Rates fell continuously from March 1997 to July 1998 by slightly more
than 100 b.p. to reach levels as low as those of November 1993. It is also worth noting
though that by the end of our sample period, the outstanding coupon had adjusted down
to 7.5%.
Figure 4 shows the variation of the OAS of the IO’s in our data over the period Autumn







































The option-adjusted spreads on a panel of interest only strips is plotted over time.  Each monthly data
point is formed by taking a daily average of the spreads for that month.  The data is from Salomon-Smith-
Barney.
1993 to Spring 1998. One readily observes the large swings of the OAS of the IO’s, from
values above 500 b.p. in the beginning of the period to values close to zero in 1994 and 1996
when interest rates were very high. The OAS of PO’s give a somewhat symmetric image,
although at smaller magnitudes (as predicted by equation (10)). One should also note that
the interest rate alone is not enough to understand the relative magnitude of the OAS of
the IO between 1993 and 1998 when rates were at the same level: OAS are much higher in
1993 than in 1998. This in fact is not a puzzle in light of our derivations, since equations
(18)—(19) tells us that the OAS of the IO is proportional to ¯ c − r and not r alone. Indeed,
when looking at ¯ c − r,w eﬁnd that it is twice as high in 1993 than in 1998.
4.2 Cross-sectional estimates of the market price of risk
We run a cross-sectional regression, one for each month, where we estimate λt based on,
OASkt
IO = αt + βkλt + ²t
These estimates exploit only the slope of the OAS. The variation in the level is picked up
in αt (for example, αt picks up any time varying interest rate risk premium).
The λt estimates along with other sample statistics using β-stdev are in Table 3. The
estimation errors are uniformly tight and the R2 are high. In fact, for most of the months
t h eO A Sc a nb ec l e a r l yr a n k e db yt h eβk’s. We ﬁnd this very encouraging for the theory
17b e c a u s ei ts u g g e s t st h a tp r e p a y m e n tr i s kh a sal o tt od ow i t ht h eO A S ,a n dt h a to u rm e a s u r e
of βk is in fact picking up the cross-sectional prepayment risk of the IO’s.
Table 3: Regressions OASkt
IO=λt β-stdev + constantt, for each month t
λt is the market price of risk, β-stdev is the prepayment risk measure
Regression Month λ estimated Std. Error R-squared N (# obs.) Regression Month λ estimated Std. Error R-squared N (# obs.)
Nov-93 1200 211 0.941 3 Jan-96 326 223 0.239 8
Dec-93 1384 129 0.968 4 Feb-96 309 175 0.266 8
Jan-94 980 152 0.892 4 Mar-96 472 64 0.848 8
Feb-94 1041 114 0.932 4 Apr-96 443 62 0.845 8
Mar-94 760 91 0.932 4 May-96 361 51 0.799 8
Apr-94 416 116 0.744 4 Jun-96 421 68 0.862 8
May-94 407 84 0.836 4 Jul-96 409 62 0.809 9
Jun-94 412 65 0.884 4 Aug-96 429 56 0.843 9
Jul-94 303 45 0.876 4 Sep-96 391 48 0.842 9
Aug-94 285 40 0.897 4 Oct-96 334 49 0.803 9
Sep-94 201 132 0.488 5 Nov-96 390 56 0.854 9
Oct-94 208 87 0.713 5 Dec-96 344 58 0.849 9
Nov-94 220 76 0.773 5 Jan-97 246 39 0.837 9
Dec-94 256 89 0.746 5 Feb-97 260 38 0.786 9
Jan-95 203 49 0.815 6 Mar-97 245 30 0.885 9
Feb-95 308 53 0.887 6 Apr-97 242 28 0.871 9
Mar-95 312 75 0.808 6 May-97 176 37 0.642 9
Apr-95 331 74 0.828 6 Jun-97 201 43 0.699 9
May-95 669 179 0.603 7 Jul-97 245 50 0.734 9
Jun-95 1068 266 0.629 7 Aug-97 171 57 0.531 9
Jul-95 932 191 0.661 7 Sep-97 135 61 0.382 9
Aug-95 970 240 0.663 8 Oct-97 197 64 0.601 9
Sep-95 939 196 0.754 8 Nov-97 250 72 0.546 9
Oct-95 701 148 0.731 8 Dec-97 360 85 0.572 9
Nov-95 692 146 0.726 8 Jan-98 303 118 0.398 9
Dec-95 576 161 0.642 8 Feb-98 235 108 0.283 9
Mar-98 324 121 0.421 9
Figure 5 graphs the estimate of λ using β-stdev as well as the one standard deviation
envelopes around the estimate. Also pictured is the diﬀerence between ¯ ct and rt.A t a
broad level the two series seem to follow each other. Early in the sample the ﬁti sq u i t e
close. Later in the sample, while the ups and downs in the two series seem to track each
other, the λ estimates seem like a muted version of ¯ ct − rt.
We conjecture that the more muted relationship later in the period may have to do
with a falling ρ over the sample period. It is well documented that in the 1993/1994 period
a number of mortgage hedge funds suﬀered losses, and many went out of business. We
conjecture that this led to a loss of capital in the mortgage market and lower capacity for
risk taking. As time passed, capital ﬂowed back into these funds and ρ fell. Froot (2001)
ﬁnds this eﬀect in the catastrophe insurance market. We intend to investigate this more in
future work.
Figure 6 graphs the estimate of λ using the β-PCA. The results are similar to those of
Figure 5.



































































































The estimates of the market price of prepayment risk (λ) using the β-Stdev as the measure of
security-specific prepayment risk, is plotted over time.
4.3 Tests using the entire panel
We now report the results of testing our model using the entire panel. Table 3 reports
regressions based on the following model.
OASkt
IO = αt + γk + A × βk (¯ ct − rt)+²kt
The regression includes both ﬁxed eﬀects and time eﬀects.
Both the OAS series and the (¯ ct − rt) series are persistent, so there is correlation in
the standard errors. We correct for this in two ways. First, most of the regressions report
standard errors using the clustering option on STATA (cluster by security). In Table 5, we
also report regressions based on ﬁrst-diﬀerencing the data.
Table 4
Regressions based on the OAS of the IO’s:
OASkt
IO = αt + γk + A × βk(¯ ct − rt)+²kt.
We also consider idiosynck (¯ ct − rt) as an explanatory variable.
βk-stdev βk-PCA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
βk(¯ ct − rt) 438.1 (4.13) 546.5 (5.81) 315.1 (5.57) 405.9 (2.73) 218 (0.81)
idiosynck (¯ ct − rt) 576 (0.59)
R2 0.93 0.95 0.92 0.93 0.93
N 383 194 189 383 383
Estimates reported with T-statistics based on clustered (by security) standard errors in
parentheses. All regressions have ﬁxed-eﬀects and time-eﬀects (not reported).



































































































The estimates of the market price of prepayment risk (λ) using the β-PCA as the measure of
security-specific prepayment risk, is plotted over time.
Columns (1) - (4) of Table 4 contain the veriﬁcation that our model ﬁts the data.
Column (1) is based on β-stdev, while column (4) is based on β-PCA. Column (2) and (3)
gives the results from two sub-samples. We divided the sample into roughly equal number
of observations. June 1996 is the dividing point between the two sub-samples (there are
less observations early in our sample).
We note the lower (but as signiﬁcant) coeﬃcient in speciﬁcation (3) compared to (2).
This accords with our conjecture that there was more risk-bearing capacity (i.e lower ρ)i n
the latter half of the sample.
Column (5) contains the result of the following regression:
OASkt
IO = αt + γk + A × βk (¯ ct − rt)+B × idiosynck (¯ ct − rt)+²kt
Our theory predicts that the idiosyncratic risk should not be priced. Unfortunately, as
mentioned earlier, there is not enough independent variation in idiosynck and βk to fashion
a meaningful test of this prediction. Because the two series are so collinear, the standard
errors on the estimates blow-up and neither coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant.
The persistence in the two data series may raise concerns that the correlation we ﬁnd is
spurious. Table 4 reports the result of a regression based on ﬁrst-diﬀerencing the series:12
∆OASkt
IO = αt + A × ∆βk (¯ ct − rt)+²kt
The coeﬃcients estimates do fall, but the results remain highly signiﬁcant. Again there is
af a l li nt h ec o e ﬃcient in the second half of the sample (speciﬁcation (2) versus (3)).
12Adding a ﬁxed eﬀect to this regression has little eﬀect since we are ﬁrst-diﬀerencing the data.
20Table 5
Regressions based on the OAS of the IO’s:
∆OASkt
IO = αt + A × ∆βk(¯ ct − rt)+²kt.
βk is the β-stdev.
(1) (2) (3)
∆βk(¯ ct − rt) 175.1 (3.07) 222.1 (2.73) 76.3 (2.21)
R2 0.71 0.68 0.81
N 374 186 180
Estimates reported with T-statistics based on robust standard errors in parentheses.
Time dummies not reported.
5 Robustness checks
5.1 Is the OAS due to a mis-speciﬁed interest rate model?
As we have noted before, the OAS may be due to a mis-speciﬁed term structure model. In
this case, the OAS will reﬂect an interest rate risk premium.
There are a few reasons to think that this is not the case. If the OAS is picking up
an interest rate risk premium, then we would expect that the OAS on the IO and the PO
would have the same sign, and changes in these OAS would be positively correlated. This
is not the case in the data. To see this, we return to our original valuation expressions for
the IO and PO ((1) and (2)). Previously, in order to arrive at expressions for the pricing of
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Note that the eﬀect of a change in the prepayment rate has the opposite sign on the
value of the IO and the PO. On the other hand, changing r has the same sign on the value
of the IO and the PO. The latter statement is simply because both the IO and the PO are
bonds, and increasing (decreasing) the market interest rate, lowers (raises) the value of a
bond.
13Note that we have constructed ∆φ
k to be the innovation to prepayments that is orthogonal to interest
rates. Thus ∆φ
k and ∆r are uncorrelated.
21This observation helps us to reject the alternative that the OAS is an interest rate risk
premium. Suppose that the market price of interest rate risk was λr.T h e n d e r i v i n g t h e
equilibrium prices of IO and PO lead us to,
ck
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It is clear that if the prepayment risk term was zero, then the OAS on the IO and
the PO would have the same sign and changes in the OAS for both IO and PO would be
positively correlated. In fact, the OAS on the IO and the PO typically have opposite signs.
Moreover, changes in these OAS almost always have opposite signs. Figure 7 plots the time
series of the OAS for IO’s and PO’s for four of our securities. The evidence suggests that












































































































































































































OAS IO OAS PO
Figure 7: Time series of OAS for IO’s and PO’s
The option adjusted spreads of both IO and PO for four of the mortgage pools are plotted over time.
It may still be possible that there is a small interest rate risk premium in the OAS. But
this should not pollute our estimates. Our basic regressions have time-dummies that will
absorb all time variation in the risk premium. Thus as long as the interest risk premium is
not higher for the securities with higher measured prepayment risk (i.e. β’s), our estimates
will be unaﬀected.
225.2 Is the OAS due to a mis-speciﬁed model of the prepayment option?
The other leading candidate explanation for the OAS is that it is due to an incorrect model of
the homeowner’s prepayment option. This possibility is harder to dismiss than the interest
risk premium hypothesis. The reason — following on the logic of the previous subsection —
is that faster prepayments lower the value of the IO while raising the value of the PO. This
will naturally give rise to the result that the OAS on the IO’s and the PO’s have opposite
signs (and have changes that have opposite signs). Thus we cannot use a similar argument
to that of the previous subsection.




r + ¯ φk + OASk
IO
Suppose that informed market participants have a true model of prepayments which is actu-
ally ˆ φk. If the average market participant quotes the OAS based on an incorrect assessment
of prepayment and uses ¯ φk, then an additional discount rate of ˆ φk − ¯ φk is required in order
to recover the true market prices. In this case, the OAS is equal to ˆ φk − ¯ φk.
Note that the OAS on the IO’s in our sample are for the most positive, while those on
the PO are negative. Thus, under the mis-speciﬁed model hypothesis, the OAS must be
b a s e do nam o d e lw h i c hc o n s i s t e n t l yunderpredicts prepayments.
It is not clear why underprediction should be a regularity of prepayment models, but we
attempt to control for this possibility in a few ways. If the underprediction can be written
as,
ˆ φk − ¯ φk = αk + γt,
then the ﬁxed-eﬀects/time-eﬀects regression speciﬁcation we have used should take care of
mis-speciﬁcation. That is, for example, if the underprediction was constant across time,
but varying by security, then the αk’s should pick up this mis-speciﬁcation.
Thus the only case that poses a problem for our results is if the underprediction was
a function of both security and time. This is more generally a virtue of our estimation
strategy. Since our estimation is based on the interaction between a security eﬀect (βk)a n d
at i m ee ﬀect (¯ ct − rt), all alternative hypotheses that have implications either for the time
series or the cross-section, separately, have been controlled for.
Suppose that the underprediction is proportional to ¯ φk. That is, suppose that ˆ φk is
equal to ¯ φk times a constant. This will clearly match the sign patterns of the OAS of the
IO and PO. We run the following regression to account for this possibility,
OASkt
IO = αt + γk + A × βk (¯ ct − rt)+B × skt + ²kt
23where, skt is the actual single month mortality (SMM) for month t.W ea l s or u nt h es a m e
speciﬁcation using an average of skt where the average is for 13 months centered around
month t.
T h er e s u l t sa r er e p o r t e di nt h eﬁrst two columns of Table 6. The skt variables are not
signiﬁcant, while the coeﬃcient on our model does drop but remains highly signiﬁcant.
Table 6
Regressions based on the OAS of the IO’s:
OASkt
IO = αt + γk + A × βk(¯ ct − rt)+²kt.
βk is the β-stdev. Additional explanatory variables are:
skt:S M Mf o rs e c u r i t y - k,m o n t h - t,
¯ skt: one-year moving average of skt,
ck × rt:c o u p o no fs e c u r i t y - k interacted with rt.
(1) (2) (3)
βk(¯ ct − rt) 228.0 (3.74) 214.5 (4.0) 226.9 (4.27)
skt -12.8 (-0.66)
¯ skt 5.7 (0.15)
ck × rt 16.9 (6.81)
R2 0.93 0.94 0.96
N 374 344 383
All regressions have ﬁxed-eﬀects and time-eﬀects (not reported).
Estimates reported with T-statistics based on clustered (by security) standard errors in
parentheses.
We have mentioned earlier that another explanation behind the OAS may be that traders
use too low an interest rate volatility in their prepayment model. In this case, the prepay-
ment option will be undervalued in the traders’ models, giving rise to a positive OAS for
the IO’s (and a negative one for the PO’s). This eﬀect will vary across the moneyness of
the option, possibly in a non-linear fashion. We control for this possibility by introducing
a term that is quadratic in ck and r:
A(ck)2 + Bckr + Cck + Dr + Er2.
Since our basic regression already has a time-eﬀect and a ﬁxed-eﬀect the terms involving
only ck or only r are already controlled for. So, the regression we run is,
OASkt
IO = αt + γk + A × βk (¯ ct − rt)+B × ckrt + ²t
24The result is in the last column of Table 6. The interaction term is signiﬁcant suggesting
that there is some mis-speciﬁcation that distorts the OAS. The coeﬃcient on our model still
remain signiﬁcant.
Another possible reason for underprediction that has been suggested to us is the “ra-
tional prepayment” hypothesis.14 Banks typically calibrate their prepayment functions to
historical experience. Consumers have in the past exercised their reﬁnancing options sub-
optimally. In particular, in cases where consumers should reﬁnance, they reﬁnance too little
— so low interest rate environments, for high coupon mortgages will be particularly aﬀected.
Now suppose that a smart trader knows that looking to the future, consumers will exercise
their reﬁnancing options more optimally. Then there clearly will be a bias in a model that is
calibrated to historical experience. One side of this bias is that a smart trader will require a
faster prepayment rate for high coupon mortgages in low interest rate environments. Thus
there is underprediction for these mortgages. The underprediction should by related to the
diﬀerence between ck and r. We control for this eﬀect in our speciﬁcations.
As a comment, the only problem with this hypothesis is that it also implies overpredic-
tion for low coupon mortgages. That is, in the past there has been suboptimal prepayment
of low coupon mortgages. To the extent that consumers shift to more optimal exercise of
their prepayment option, the smart trader will also predict slower prepayment for these low
coupon mortgages. We do not encounter this overprediction in our data. But it is possible
that this eﬀect is small and that our data sample is too short.
Notice that if the bias is simply proportional to ck −r then the ﬁxed-eﬀects/time-eﬀects
speciﬁcation will control for this possibility. So again, the only possibility that we need to
address is if the bias depends on both ck and r. The results of Table 6 control for this
possibility.
5.3 The quadratic dependence on interest rates
At some level, the mis-speciﬁcation possibility will always cast a shadow on our results.
Our only defense is to demonstrate results that ﬁt our theory easily, and only ﬁtav e r y
contorted theory of mis-speciﬁc a t i o n . S of a r ,w eh a v es h o w nt h a ta n ya l t e r n a t i v ew h i c h
predicts purely a ﬁxed eﬀect or a time eﬀect will not aﬀect our results. An alternative
involving the interaction between coupon and market interest rates will also not aﬀect our
results.
There is one further result of our theory that a mis-speciﬁcation theory would have to
work very hard to replicate. Our equilibrium theory predicts that the market price of risk
should vary with the average market coupon. Plausibly, a mis-speciﬁcation theory will only
14We thank John Geanokoplos for this suggestion.
25link security speciﬁc attributes (e.g., the coupon of the speciﬁc security being studied) and
the market interest rate to the OAS.
Unfortunately, there is little variation in the average market coupon over the 1993 to
1998 sample. However, from Figure 3 we note the large change in the average coupon over
the 1992 to 1993 period. We have OAS data for passthroughs over this period from Smith-
Breeden. We use this data to test the quadratic relation for the collateral (see equation
(17)) as well as to check whether the average coupon has explanatory power for this data.
The data is for the OAS on FNMA 30-year generic collateral for 8 bonds with coupons
ranging from 7.5% to 11%. Our data spans a period from October 1987 to July 1994. We
estimate the following regression:
OASkt
C = γk +( α1¯ ct + α2rt + α3) × (ck − rt)+²kt
T h em a i np r e d i c t i o no fo u rt h e o r yi st h a tα1 is positive and that α2 is negative. We
will take a positive value of α1 to imply that the average market coupon is an important
explanatory factor. The theory also predicts that α1+α2 =0 ,a n dt h a tα3 should not have
any explanatory power.
The results are reported in Table 7. The ﬁrst set of regressions are run separately by
bond. The last regression combines all of the data in a panel, and implicitly sets the βk
loadings for each security equal to each other.
The coeﬃcients on ¯ ct are uniformly positive and signiﬁcant, as predicted. It is also
encouraging that the magnitudes of α1 and α2 have opposite signs, and the α1 +α2 is close
to zero often. α3 is negative and sometimes signiﬁcant.
A possible explanation for this occasional discrepancy is that a true measure of the
model’s ¯ c would include expected values of future coupons. As in the 1980’s and 1990’s
nominal rates were largely declining, a weakly negative α3 captures the market’s expectation
that in the future, the average coupon is going to decrease. Alternatively, this occasional
discrepancy could be due to a mis-speciﬁcation of the interest rate in our simple empirical
implementation.
26Table 7
Regressions based on the OAS of the collateral:
OASkt
C = γk +( α1¯ ct + α2rt + α3) × (ck − rt)+²kt
Bond Coupon α1 α2 α3 R2 N
7.5 13.44 (1.9) -9.37 (-2.08) -54.6 (-1.38) 0.26 26
8 19.45 (5.3) -14.17 (-4.48) -73.45 (-2.52) 0.46 28
8.5 14.91 (4.51) -13.51 (-3.96) -41.97 (-1.51) 0.44 28
9 7.69 (5.09) -9.54 (-4.77) -10.35 (-0.72) 0.45 28
9.5 9.30 (7.5) -9.02 (-4.31) -27.29 (-2.02) 0.51 28
10 9.66 (6.79) -8.37 (-3.12) -34.02 (-2.31) 0.49 28
10.5 11.76 (6.83) -7.73 (-2.78) -59.23 (-4.1) 0.51 28
11 7.68 (3.61) -6.99 (-1.83) -24.13 (-1.19) 0.33 28
ALL BONDS 10.03 (10.41) -11.88 (-3.17) -17.25 (-0.83) 0.87 222
ALL BONDS regression uses the entire panel, with bond ﬁxed eﬀects.
Estimates reported with T-statistics based on robust standard errors in parentheses.
5.4 Actual MBS bond returns
We should note that one way to get around the mis-speciﬁcation issue is to use actual bond
returns as the dependent variable in our regressions. There are a few reason we have not
done this. Actual bond returns are a very noisy estimate of the expected return on the
securities.15 We need more data than we have to implement these regressions. Using the
OAS greatly reduces this measurement error problem. Breeden (1994) provides support for
this approach. He studies a large panel of GNMA securities and ﬁnds that the OAS has
strong predictive power for the subsequent returns. The results are reported in Exhibits 72,
73, and 74 of Breeden (1994). We note Exhibit 74 in particular which demonstrates that
the strongest relations is between the OAS for IO’s and subsequent returns.
6 Relation to the MBS literature
The academic work on MBS valuation is primarily concerned with prepayment modeling. In
one line of research, prepayment stems from rational choice by homeowners. This “rational”
prepayment approach was pioneered by Dunn and McConnell (1981) and investigated more
15We can reduce the noise in bond returns if we take a stand on the mortgage prepayment model and
calculate interest rate hedge-ratios. Then we can strip out the interest rate component of actual bond
returns. But this seems no better than using the OAS from the prepayment model of a dealer, as we have
done.
27recently by Stanton (1995) and Longstaﬀ (2002)16.I nt h eo t h e rm a i nl i n eo fr e s e a r c h( a n d
in the practitioner approach), prepayment behavior is modeled statistically. The justiﬁca-
tion for this approach is that, given the complexity of the constraints faced by consumers,
prepayment behavior on a pool of consumer mortgages is better captured statistically than
by modeling these complex constraints. Examples of the latter approach include Schwartz
and Torous (1989), Richard and Roll (1989), and Patruno (1994).
Our research suggests that it is also necessary to model the uncertainty surrounding
prepayment behavior, which arises naturally once we recognize that homeowners’ cost of
reﬁnancing, for example, will be subject to innovations. In our approach, we directly model
this prepayment uncertainty as an error around a mean prepayment forecast. However there
are many other ways of introducing this prepayment uncertainty, in both the rational as well
as the statistical approach. The important point we make however is that this uncertainty
is priced and that the market price of this uncertainty varies in a systematic way.
Boudoukh et al. (1997) use a novel approach to directly estimate the pricing function
for a panel of GNMA passthroughs as a function of one or two factors (long rate, long rate
and spread). They estimate this function non-parametrically using kernel techniques and
ﬁnd that the two-factor pricing model performs better (the level captures the reﬁnancing
incentive and the spread proxies for the future behavior of the discount factor used to
discount cash-ﬂows). They only use information in market prices, and focus on a pricing
functional which depends on the yield curve17, thus setting aside prepayment information.
One of their main ﬁndings is that the pricing errors under the model have a large common
factor. Our study suggests that prepayment risk18 and the average coupon outstanding in
the market are this common factor.
While the bulk of the academic literature does not address the OAS, market participants
and academics writing in more applied journals recognize that there are important time
patterns in the OAS. Breeden (1994) provides extensive documentation of how the OAS
methodology performs in rich/cheap analysis and hedging the interest rate risk of MBS
portfolios. Breeden concludes that eﬀective durations (duration keeping the OAS constant)
help to reduce risk of pass-throughs and PO’s by 40% and 25%, but perform poorly for the
more risky IO’s. For the latter, hedging is improved by using an empirical duration (i.e. a
statistical estimate of the price elasticity). The correlation between mean returns and OAS
is, however, higher for IO’s than for PO’s and pass-throughs. A closer look at the data
16See Kau and Keenan (1995) for a survey of this line of research.
17Their choice of variables is also constrained by the trade-oﬀ between adding variable to the function and
increasing pricing errors.
18Boudoukh et al. do hint at this by looking at the prepayment of the diﬀerent coupons. They ﬁnd that for
lower coupons, which have a lot of relocation-based prepayment, prepayment variables explain a signiﬁcant
fraction of the pricing errors.
28gathered by Breeden reveals that the downward bias of the eﬀective duration in measuring
real duration for collateral is systematic across securities in the discount period of 1992-
1993. Our approach recognizes that OAS should not be considered as a random pricing
residual, and proposes a model that links the uncertainty of prepayment to the OAS and,
solving the market equilibrium, derives their dynamic evolution. For example, we suggest
a change in the common practice of computing duration. The usual practice is to compute
durations under a prepayment model by changing the interest rate, while holding the OAS
ﬁxed. Our works suggests that the OAS is also a function of interest rates and therefore
current practice will yield a biased duration.
7 Conclusion
We provide theory and evidence that the marginal investor in the mortgage-backed securities
market is a trader who is wholly invested in the mortgage market. The theory predicts that
prepayment risk — a risk that is diversiﬁable in the aggregate — is priced and that the pricing
of this risk depends on the value of the entire mortgage market.
The evidence is consistent with recent “limits of arbitrage” theories. If the marginal
investor is a mortgage trader, then other sources of variation in the mortgage trader’s mar-
ginal utility will also aﬀect MBS prices. For example, if hedge funds are capital constrained
then the capital deployed by hedge funds in the MBS market will be an important state
variable in determining prices. Thus the increase in MBS spreads in the Fall of 1998 also
ﬁts with our evidence.
If a limited amount of capital sets prices in the MBS market then changes in supply will
have important price eﬀects. Customer sales/mortgage securitizations have to be absorbed
by this limited capital, and one would naturally expect prices to fall in such events. That
is, the market will exhibit liquidity eﬀects. The liquidity of the market however has nothing
to do with bid-ask spreads; It reﬂects the limited capital of MBS traders.
Although our evidence suggests market segmentation, it suggests a fairly subtle form
of segmentation. MBS traders are able to hedge out all interest rate risk via the Treasury
bond market. They only retain the prepayment risk in mortgages. That is the interest rate
component of MBS is priced in an integrated market, only the prepayment risk is priced
locally to the mortgage market.
Our approach also raises a host of issues that could be of interest to academics, both
empirical and theoretical. First, and most importantly, more empirical work should be done
to investigate the issues we have highlighted. We have established our results in a fairly
small sample. Secondly, better prepayment models should be constructed that pay attention
to the variance of the errors in the prepayment forecasts. Models developed thus far just
29assume, because they assume rational prepayments, a zero uncertainty in the prepayment
side. Our analysis highlights that when prepayment uncertainty is non-zero, prices will be
aﬀected.
Finally, the success of our approach for MBS also suggests new directions to explore
in other asset markets. We think that this approach may hold some promise in the bond
market. We conjecture that the term premium in the bond markets should be an increasing
function of the average maturity outstanding in the bond market. The intuition is that when
the average maturity outstanding is high, the market is riskier (the duration is higher), so
that the risk premia, and hence the slope of the yield curve, should be higher. More work
is needed to assess these conjectures.
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